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THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL
ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:
TESTIMONY OF LOUIS H. POLLAK BEFORE
THE COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF
POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE,
OCTOBER 11, 1996
HONORABLE Louis H. POLLAK*
Mr. Chairman, I know I speak for Professor [Stephen] Burbank
[of the University of Pennsylvania Law School] as well as for my-
self in expressing our great gratification at the privilege of appear-
ing before this Commission, which certainly has a very important
mission and agenda laid out for it, as the carefully crafted re-
marks of Mr. Shestack [Jerome J. Shestack, President-elect of the
American Bar Association] have so clearly indicated.
Professor Burbank and I are charged, as we understand it, with
undertaking to present a kind of preliminary view of the historical
framework within which these very serious questions of judicial
independence - what is it? what is it for? what is its scope? - are
to be examined by you.
The way we have marked out our work for you is that I am to go
back into our early history, back to 1787 and 1789, and talk about
the first couple of decades, and then Professor Burbank, who
moves at much greater speed than I, will bring you forward from
approximately the Madison presidency to the present day...
Now, Mr. Shestack properly took us back to what [Alexander]
Hamilton said in The Federalist Papers.1 That, of course, flows
very directly from the discussions, though less focused than Ham-
* Senior Judge, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
The testimony which I presented to the Commission on Separation of Powers and Judi-
cial Independence was ex tempore. In the St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary, I have
edited the testimony very slightly in order to render it reasonably intelligible. The foot-
notes which follow are not my work; they are the work of the editors of the Journal who felt
that it would be useful if the testimony which I presented were supported by some modi-
cum of appropriate scholarly apparatus. Needless to say, I am most grateful to the editors
for their efforts to ornament the testimony with an aura of academic respectability.
1 THE FEDERALIST (Alexander Hamilton).
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ilton may have made them appear to be, in the Constitutional
Convention itself.
2
I won't undertake to rehearse in any detail what Hamilton had
to tell us in The Federalist Papers because it is well known, I
think, to all of us.3 But, basically, I suggest that it is of some inter-
est that, in laying out the basic propositions about permanency in
office and the necessity for judges to be assured a compensation
that would not be diminished, Hamilton . . . addressed those is-
sues first before he went on to tell his readers what it was that the
federal judges were supposed to do, and that seems to me a kind of
intriguing way to make up a job description...I
Why did Hamilton proceed in that fashion? I think the answer
may be that he immediately tied the principles of permanency in
office and the others that go along with it, such as those having to
do with compensation, to the necessity of such protections for the
judicial office in a judicial system which is going to have the power
of judicial review. Hamilton refered to this as judges engaged in
the judicial work of enforcing a "limited Constitution."
And then Hamilton went on to announce and defend the process
of judicial review - which is, of course, nowhere specified in the
Constitution's text - in a fairly elaborate way.6 So one, I think,
can surmise that Mr. Hamilton's real preachment was, this is
what we expect our judges to be doing, watching out for legisla-
tures that may get too full of themselves and start passing unat-
tractive laws.7
However that may be, Hamilton certainly laid out very clearly
what the conditions are that will insulate the judiciary from the
executive and the legislature,8 recognizing, as Mr. Shestack
2 See generally CHRISTOPHER COLLIER & JAMES LINCOLN COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILADEL-
PHIA 202-04 (1986) (discussing scope ofjudiciary's power); MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMINO OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 155-65 (1913) (describing debates over judiciary).
3 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78-83 (Alexander Hamilton) (detailing role judiciary would
play under new government).
4 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79 (Alexander Hamilton) (reciting how judges are to be
appointed, tenured, and compensated).
5 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Everyman's Library 1965)
(noting that "[tihe complete independence of the courts ofjustice is peculiarily essential in
a limited Constitution").
6 See id. at 397 (stating that Constitution is "fundamental law" and it is within judicial
power to determine whether Legislative or Executive acts violate Constitution).
7 See id. at 398 (providing that judges have duty to ensure that laws passed do not con-
tradict Constitution).
s See id. at 399-400. Hamilton argues judicial independence is essential to allow judges
to be unaffected by societal forces. Id.
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pointed out, that Hamilton identified "the judiciary [as the] least
dangerous" branch of government because, having "no influence
over either the sword or the purse . . . [ilt may truly be said to
have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment."9
Now, in thinking about what problems build from Hamilton's
classic formulation, I suggest that it probably is useful to go for-
ward from 1787-1789, when the process of ratification was going
on - the process that Hamilton and Madison and Jay were trying
to promote in The Federalist Papers - to what I suggest was the
first major crisis in the history of the federal judiciary in our his-
tory, which was the period commencing in 1801 running for per-
haps the next three or four years.
It seems to me appropriate to connect the problem of impeach-
ment, as it came to a culmination in the attempted removal of Jus-
tice Chase, and the problem of reorganizing the judiciary includ-
ing, among other features, the elimination of existing courts.
In 1801, we may remember, the departing Adams administra-
tion thought to perpetuate itself in some limited authority, since it
wasn't any longer going to dominate the executive or legislative
branches, by entrenching Federalists in that "least dangerous"
branch. And one step to accomplish this was to pass legislation
which enlarged enormously the jurisdiction of the federal courts
so as to make that jurisdiction almost coextensive with the consti-
tutional grant, as opposed to keeping it, at least at the trial level,
primarily diversity and admiralty jurisdiction. The legislation'
also eliminated what had been an incubus, the circuit-riding re-
sponsibilities of the Supreme Court Justices. But the center-piece
of the Adams administration's legislation was the restructuring of
what the Constitution denominates the "inferior [federal] courts"
so as to provide for sixteen circuit judgeships. By no coincidence
all of the sixteen worthies nominated by President Adams and
confirmed by the Senate were of the Federalist political persua-
9 See id. at 395. Hamilton also opines that, of the three branches, the judiciary "Will be
least in a capacity to annoy or injure [the political rights of the Constitution]." Id.
10 See Federal Judiciary Act of 1801 (creating new circuit courts and sixteen circuit court
judgeships for President Adams to fill); see also Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and
Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 993 Sup.
CT. REV. 329, 350-51 (1993) (describing details of Act); Kathryn Turner, Federalist Policy
and the Judiciary Act of 1801, 22 WM. & MARY L.Q. 3, 32 (1965) (expounding on key aspects
of Act). See generally GEORGE L. HASKiNs & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER:
JOHN MARSHALL 1801-15, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 183-86
(1981) (detailing Court's reaction to Judiciary Act of 1801).
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sion - including, I may say, quite a number of lawyers highly
qualified for their office, notwithstanding that at that time judicial
nominations were not scrutinized by the American Bar
Association.
When Mr. Jefferson's party came into power, the first thing on
their agenda was to jettison that legislation, which they did, and
essentially restored the judiciary to the structure set up in 1789
both as to organization and as to jurisdiction and, indeed, as to
Supreme Court Justices' circuit-riding."
That clearly generated some rather significant questions for the
newly-appointed Federalist judges. What about their jobs? They
were appointed to and confirmed in and commissioned with posi-
tions of life tenure - or, to use the constitutional term, "good be-
havior." But good behavior, it turned out, seemed only to last for
about a year and the new Congress had turned them out. Had
something unconstitutional happened?
There was that rather significant problem and there were asso-
ciated problems. Could Congress shuffle and reshuffle the juris-
diction of the trial courts? And did Congress have authority to
require Supreme Court Justices to ride circuit? Congress had
done it before, but then the Justices had been relieved of that duty
briefly and none of them was eager to resume it.
The first set of problems was generated by the Jefferson Con-
gress' (1) repeal of the Adams Congress' court-reorganization leg-
islation and (2) restoration of the old order. Was that constitu-
tional? That was settled in 1803 when two things happened:
First, the judges piteously appealed to Congress with a long and
well-drawn petition explaining how they had these fine positions
and now they seemed to be removed and what was Congress going
to do about it? The answer was: nothing.
Next, there was the question whether the Supreme Court was
going to accept the repeal? That issue came to the Supreme Court
in the almost forgotten case of Stuart v. Laird,12 a case decided, it
is to be noted, only six days after a case called Marbury v.
11 See Act of Apr. 29, 1802, § 4, 2 Stat. 156, 157-58. This Act was Jefferson's statutory
reaction to the Judicary Act and succeeded in repealing all aspects of it. Id.; Alfange, supra
note 10, at 350-60. The author describes Jefferson's reaction and attempt to repeal the Act
when he became President. Id.
12 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
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Madison,13 was decided. And the Supreme Court, in a very brief
three-paragraph opinion by Justice Paterson, affirmed the order of
the judge who had decided the case below - Chief Justice Mar-
shall, sitting on circuit - dismissing the constitutional chal-
lenge.14 The Supreme Court evidently felt that the path of pru-
dence, as well as the path of constitutional interpretation, lay in
acknowledging that Congress' Article III power to "ordain and es-
tablish" the "inferior courts" included a power to disestablish such
courts. Article III seems to posit the Supreme Court as the single
unalterable tribunal in the structure. 5
I think it's fair to say that Stuart v. Laird6 was the litigation
that was most talked about and rather fearfully apprehended by
the Jeffersonians in 1803. Marbury v. Madison,17 was a minor ir-
ritant, at least until it was decided. I think, at the time, the politi-
cians and the bar generally were much more concerned with the
issues posed in Stuart v. Laird,i" and the Supreme Court took the
role of convenient deferral to the legislative branch.
Now, implicit in Stuart v. Laird - but not explicit and not re-
ally generated by the issues in that litigation - were questions
which remain with us today; questions as to the authority of Con-
gress not merely to rearrange courts, but to withdraw jurisdiction
from courts on a selective basis that might be thought to be a leg-
islative attempt to determine the outcomes, or preclude outcomes
entirely, in certain kinds of litigation. Those questions became
very much alive in the post-Civil War era when Congress was
afraid that the Court was going to strike down much of the Recon-
struction legislation; we recall in that connection the McCardle'9
13 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
14 See Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 308-09 (citing Congress' power and Supreme Court
justices inability to sit as circuit judges as reasons for reversal).
15 See id. at 309. "Congress have constitutional authority to establish, from time to time,
such inferior tribunals as they may think proper: and to transfer a cause from one such
tribunal to another." Id. Justice Paterson continued that:
The judges of the supreme court have no right to sit as circuit judges, not being ap-
pointed as such, or in other words, that they ought to have distinct commissions for
that purpose. To this objection, which is of recent date, it is sufficient to observe, that
practice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing with the
organization of the judicial system, afford an irresistible answer, and have indeed fixed
the construction.
Id.
16 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
17 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
18 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
19 Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-27 (1867) (ruling that federal courts
have jurisdiction over decisions of military commissions under Reconstruction Acts).
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case. And only this year, at the very end of the last term of the
Court, we find the Supreme Court returning to those questions in
Felker v. Turpin,2 ° sustaining a portion of the anti-terrorism legis-
lation that, among other things, drastically reduces the scope of
habeas corpus.21
In Felker, the Court was satisfied that no constitutional issue
was raised by the reduction of its authority to review certain cate-
gories of lower-court habeas corpus judgments because the Court
retained its general power to issue what are called, somewhat
anomalously, "original" writs of habeas corpus.22 So those issues
remain very much alive today.
In reviewing the court-related problems of the Jeffersonian
presidency, in addition to considering issues related to the reor-
ganization of the courts, we have to look back at what happened
on the impeachment front. The Jeffersonians were handed an ini-
tial opportunity, which they seized, to try to utilize the impeach-
ment process as a mechanism for getting rid of those Federalist
judges who were perceived as particularly hostile to the policies of
the Jefferson administration. That initial opportunity consisted of
the very sad case of District Judge John Pickering of New Hamp-
shire, who was apparently insane, and who became an alcoholic as
well in his declining years of mental debility. In an unedifying
spectacle the ill judge was impeached by the House and convicted
by the Senate.23
Energized by their success with Pickering, the Jeffersonians
went ahead to try to impeach Justice Samuel Chase, who, as a
bitter-end Federalist, was an obvious target. Had it turned out
that Chase could be removed, the next and larger target would
likely have been Jefferson's cousin - and enemy - John Marshall.
But, as we all know, although the House impeached Chase, the
Senate, by a narrow margin, declined to convict. The received
20 116 S.Ct. 2333 (1996).
21 Id. at 2340 (upholding statute that limits state prisoners habeus corpus petitions to
federal courts).
22 See id. at 2338-39 (holding that court still has power to hear orginal writs of habeas
corpus).
23 See ELEANORE BUSHNELL, CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES: THE FEDERAL IMPEACH-
MENT TRIALS 43-55 (1992) (depicting successful impeachment of deficient and alcoholic
Judge Pickering); see also HASKINS, supra note 10, at 217-19 (detailing impeaching process
of Judge Pickering); Wilfred Feinberg, Constraining 'The Least Dangerous Branch. The
Tradition of Attacks on Judicial Power, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 252, 256 (1984) (describing Pick-
ering as mentally incompetent and alcoholic).
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view is that Justice Chase was being pursued for political reasons,
though many of the charges against him related to his conduct on
the bench, and the failure to convict was regarded as a defeat for
those who thought that impeachment could serve purposes that in
English law frequently had been accomplished by measures of ad-
dress in Parliament to get rid of judges who were simply unpopu-
lar with the prevailing political regime.
Only this last spring, in April of this year, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, in a lecture at American University,24 noted the Chase pro-
ceedings and said that the acquittal of Justice Chase provided "as-
surance to federal judges that their judicial acts, their rulings
from the bench, would not be a basis for removal from office by
impeachment and conviction, and that has been the guiding prin-
ciple of the House of Representatives and the Senate from that
day to this."25
The aspect of protecting judges from withdrawals of compensa-
tion has happily not been a major issue. There have been a couple
of curious side shows, as when the Supreme Court early in this
century briefly concluded that the imposition of income taxes on
federal judges violated their entitlement to a protected compensa-
tion.26 But, happily, that precedent has been substantially
diluted.2 7
I think you know that just this week the Supreme Court found
itself unable to review a decision of the Federal Circuit which held
that federal judges who had been in office before 1983 could not
constitutionally be required to pay Social Security taxes imposed
subsequent to their appointment to the bench.2" That decision of
the Federal Circuit was affirmed by the Supreme Court for the
reason that four members of the Supreme Court found themselves
disqualified - presumably, by financial interest - from partici-
24 See William Rehnquist, Symposium: The Future of the Federal Courts, 46 AM. U. L.
REV. 263 (1996) (discussing federal judicial system in America).
25 Id. at 273.
26 See Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 255-57 (1920) (citations omitted) (holding that Con-
gress' ability to impose income tax on federal judiciary would encroach upon judicial
independence).
27 See O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 281 (1939) (allowing Congress to tax judici-
ary so long as it was non-discrmanitory); see also Beer v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, 64 T.C. 879, 881-84 (1975) (upholding income tax on federal judge).
28 See Hatter v. United States, 64 F.3d 643, 649-52 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (ruling that with-
holding of social security taxes from salaries of Article IIn judges who took office before
social security taxes were imposed diminished their compensation in violation of Constitu-
tion's compensation clause), affd mem., 117 S. Ct. 39 (1996).
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pating, and the remaining five Justices did not form a quorum. So
the decision of the Federal Circuit - to which I mean no disre-
spect in suggesting that there might have been other ways of de-
ciding that case - has been affirmed with no precedential force,
as if by an equally divided Court.29
Before belately turning the lectern over to Professor Burbank,
let me briefly refer to two other items that I think may be worth
recalling from the 1790s. In Hayburn's Case, the Justices declined
as judges to take on the duty of reviewing Revolutionary War pen-
sion applications. They declined as judges to perform that office
because, as judges, they felt they could not make determinations
which would then be reviewable, as the statute called for, by the
Secretary of War.3 0 That would destroy the finality of judicial dis-
position that the Justices felt was required of the judicial office.3 1
That easy conclusion suggested, but left unanswered, questions
that remain unanswered to this very day of the extent to which
Congress can provide for the rearrangement of determinations
made by the federal judiciary. Conceptually the proposition is
that a final judgment cannot be altered or modified in any way by
any subsequent legislative enactment, though, of course, Congress
is free to lay down new rules of law for the future.2 I refer you to
the most recent preachment of the Supreme Court on these mat-
ters in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms,33 in which, speaking through
Justice Scalia, seven justices found unconstitutional a congres-
sional attempt in 1991 to overturn the effects of a 1991 Supreme
Court decision determining what the statute of limitations should
be in § 10(b)(5) 3'4 actions.35 Congressional action to require the re-
instatement of decisions of cases which had been dismissed by vir-
29 See id. at 39 (declaring that decision has same effect as if it was made by equally
divided court).
30 See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 410-411 (1792) (ruling that allowing Secra-
tary of War, or any other Executive or Legislative official to review decisions of courts vio-
lated Constitution).
31 See id. at 411-12 (asserting federal courts need to be independent of other branches to
be successful).
32 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. "In all other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court
shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." Id.
33 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
34 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27A, 15 U.S.C. 78 (1991); Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240 (1994).
35 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1453-56 (1995) (citing Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)) (holding that Congress' attempt to overrule
Supreme Court decision was unconstitutional).
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tue of the Supreme Court's 1991 ruling was found by the Court in
Plaut to be unconstitutional. 6
In the 1790s, the Court also made it plain that it could not be in
the business of giving legal advice to the administration. They
turned back Mr. Jefferson's request, on behalf of President Wash-
ington, that the Justices advise the President about the neutrality
doctrines that would be important for the executive to have in
mind in dealing with the difficulties presented by the pending
warfare between Britain and France. The Justices reminded the
President that the Constitution provided that he could ask his
principal executive officers for advice; notwithstanding their great
respect for the Presidency and the President, the Justices felt that
it was not consistent with the separation of powers for judges to be
advising the President.
The last thing I would mention of our early history is the deci-
sion by the Supreme Court in 1812, then reaffirmed in 1816, that
there was no such thing as a federal common law of crimes.37 The
Court was withdrawing from an arena in which quite conceivably
it would find itself in competition with the legislature. It was a
part of the security blanket of non-pretension, except where abso-
lutely critical, as the Court found it to be in Marbury v. Madison, 8
that characterized the Court in those very early days of defining
the role of federal judges.
36 See id. at 1477 (stating that Supreme Court has last word on judicial decision, thus
Congress can not change judicial decision by passing legislation that applies retroactively).
37 See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 215 (1821) (ruling that there is no such
thing as federal common law of crimes).
38 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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